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Mitchell et al.'s claim, that their propositional theory is a single-process theory, is illusory because they relegate some learning to a secondary memory process. This renders the single-process theory untestable. The propositional account is not a process theory of learning, but rather, a heuristic that has led to interesting research. © 2009 Cambridge University Press.

Original publication

DOI

10.1017/S0140525X09000879

Type

Journal article

Journal

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Publication Date

22/09/2009

Volume

32

Pages

199 - 200