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The development of brain organoids and use of human embryonic neural structures for research each raise distinct ethical considerations that require careful analysis. We propose that rather than attempting to resolve longstanding debates about embryonic moral status, a more productive approach is to examine how different positions on this fundamental question lead to distinct conclusions about appropriate research strategies. For those who ground moral status in species membership or developmental potential, even early-stage embryo research may be ethically impermissible, suggesting focus on carefully bounded organoid development. Conversely, for those who ground moral status in current capacities, embryonic neural tissue studied before the emergence of consciousness may offer significant advantages over organoids while raising fewer novel ethical concerns. Our analysis reveals inadequacies in current policies, particularly the 14-day rule, which appears difficult to justify under either ethical framework. We demonstrate how careful attention to the relationship between ethical premises and research implications can advance both scientific progress and ethical oversight, while suggesting specific policy reforms including capacity-based research guidelines and sophisticated monitoring protocols.

Original publication

DOI

10.1136/jme-2025-110821

Type

Journal article

Journal

J Med Ethics

Publication Date

17/07/2025

Keywords

Embryo Research, Embryos and Fetuses, Ethics, Research, Moral Status